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Cover Photo: A “flood-risk zone” in Peru’s Rimac River valley. Although typically characterized by extreme aridity, Peru’s Pacific slope is one of the planet’s most 
exposed and vulnerable regions to El Niño-triggered flooding and related disasters.  
4Peru is a global hotspot for El Niño-related disaster risk, and recent 
severe El Niño events (1982-83, 1997-98, and 2017) have led to 
widespread loss of life and destruction of assets in this central An-
dean nation. While capacities to forecast and prepare for El Niño in 
Peru have improved markedly in recent decades, challenges linked 
to uncertainty and variability in hazard occurrence and exposure 
coupled with high levels of vulnerability in many sectors and re-
gions of the country continue to produce substantial disaster risk. 
Since 2015, these challenges have been highlighted by two dis-
tinct El Niño events. The first, which occurred from late-2015 
through mid-2016, was one of the strongest global El Niño events 
ever recorded in terms of elevated sea-surface temperatures, with 
extreme impacts widely predicted across the Pacific Basin. In Peru, 
these forecasts led to unprecedented investments in diverse pre-
paratory measures, but, contrary to expectations, the event never 
developed beyond moderate intensity in the country, and many 
experts considered it a “non-event”. The second event — termed a 
“coastal El Niño” because its impacts were limited to coastal Peru 
and Ecuador — developed rapidly in January 2017, surprising fore-
casters, authorities, and the general public. Despite the extensive 
preparations just a year earlier, this 2017 event produced dam-
ages in Peru comparable to those of the 1982-83 and 1997-98 
El Niño’s, which are broadly seen as the most destructive El Niño 
events in the country’s history. 
This study was begun at the end of the 2015-16 El Niño in an ef-
fort to document and evaluate the disaster risk management (DRM) 
measures undertaken in preparation for the event, along with the 
broader historical and institutional context for El-Niño-related risks 
and DRM in Peru. During the course of the analysis, the unforeseen 
2017 event occurred, providing additional opportunities to reflect 
on El Niño impacts and the effectiveness of earlier DRM measures 
and institutions. Grounded in the Post Event Review Capability 
(PERC) methodology but with a greater focus on institutional anal-
ysis and impacts across multiple events, this study is designed to 
provide detailed contextual information on the diverse and interact-
ing drivers of El Niño-related risks in Peru as well as on important 
advances and constraints in the country’s evolving DRM policies 
and practices. As such, the study provides a basis for understanding 
the underlying hazard, exposure, and vulnerabilities related to El 
Niño in Peru and the institutions in place to address them. Follow-
ing the PERC methodology’s emphasis on highlighting both chal-
lenges and best practices in disaster response from a non-biased 
and apolitical perspective, the report is targeted at fostering the 
consolidation and implementation of lessons learned. Additionally, 
the report provides useful background to complement a traditional 
PERC analysis of the 2017 event in Peru that is currently underway. 
The rest of this summary provides a brief overview of key findings 
and lessons presented in detail in the full report that follows.
Uncertainty and variability characterize  
El Niño
The El Niño phenomenon is a principal cause of global inter-annual 
climatic variability. While its development at the global scale can 
now be monitored and forecasted with far more precision than 
ever before, the regional to local-scale impacts of particular events 
remain impossible to predict. In 2015-16, for example, expert 
forecasts predicted high probabilities of a strong to extraordinary 
event in Peru, but the resulting El Niño was of only weak to mod-
erate intensity. One year later, the development of localized El Niño 
conditions off the Peruvian coast was not predicted in advance by 
forecasters and led to an unforeseen coastal El Niño event that 
rapidly evolved into one of the most devastating disasters in the 
country’s history.
Hazard, exposure, and vulnerability must
all be addressed
Disaster risk is a combination of hazard, exposure, and the vulner-
ability of affected populations and assets. In the context of El Niño 
disasters in Peru, all of these components of risk require sustained 
attention to reduce future disaster impacts. Specifically, measures 
to better understand the variable hazards associated with El Niño 
and to address growing exposure (e.g. through more effective 
zoning regulations and relocation processes) should be coupled 
with efforts to identify and reduce the socio-economic drivers of 
vulnerability that affect much of the country’s population and in-
frastructure.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
5A transition from emergency response to 
integrated DRM approaches is needed
DRM in Peru has long been dominated by a focus on emergency 
response. Currently a shift towards an integrated approach com-
bining reactive, corrective, and prospective DRM measures is under 
way in the national institutional context, but much work remains 
in implementing this policy change in everyday practice. Progress 
in this transition has been greatest at the national level, and there 
is a pressing need to strengthen DRM capacities at regional and 
local levels of government. Concurrent to the development of DRM 
capacities across political levels, there is a need within broader 
society to promote greater understanding of disaster risk and the 
corrective and prospective measures designed to reduce it. 
Institutional support, oversight, and  
accountability are critical to effective 
DRM implementation
With ongoing transformative changes to DRM policy and strategy 
in Peru, there is a critical need for intra- and inter-organizational 
support in the implementation of new DRM approaches, especially 
from national to sub-national levels. In light of substantial increases 
in DRM-related funding over recent years, there is also a pressing 
need to improve the abilities of governmental entities—especially 
at regional and local levels—to access and employ these funds 
effectively. Additionally, increased oversight and accountability 
around how such funds are used are needed at all governmental 
levels and particularly in the context of formally declared states of 
emergency when controls on public spending are relaxed. 
DRM should be a key component of 
long-term development planning and 
resource governance
Peru has made substantial progress in establishing laws and poli-
cies for long-term development and resource governance, including 
integrated watershed management and landscape-level planning 
processes. While implementation of these policies remains a work-
in-progress throughout the country, it is vital to build prospective 
and corrective DRM measures into these initiatives from the ear-
liest stage possible. Rather than having separate entities working 
independently to implement these related policies, efforts should 
be made to create synergies between these processes through 
inter-sectoral and multi-level collaboration and through public- 
private-civil society partnerships.
The consolidation and implementation 
of lessons learned is urgent for risk  
reduction
Many of the insights generated by this analysis are neither new 
nor surprising in the context of contemporary Peru. In fact, many 
recommendations made in the wake of earlier El Niño disasters 
have not yet been implemented; and as a result, similar patterns of 
impacts continue to reoccur across multiple events. There is an ur-
gent need to implement the lessons learned during prior disasters 
to reduce future risks and build disaster resilience. Peru’s recent 
economic growth and social stability combined with its evolving 
DRM sector and the widespread impacts of the 2017 coastal El 
Niño event provide conditions to implement the costly and conten-
tious—but ultimately more sustainable—corrective and prospec-
tive DRM measures long recommended. 
6INTRODUCTION
1 The term “coastal El Niño” has been used by Peruvian experts and media because the sea-surface temperature changes that occurred with the 2017 phenom-
enon were localized to the coastal areas of Peru and Ecuador rather than extending across the central Pacific Ocean as is typical during a normal El Niño year.
2 See: http://larepublica.pe/politica/844962-fernando-zavala-sobre-huaicos-no-estabamos-preparados-para-estos-hechos and  
http://cdn8.larepublica.pe/politica/852500-jorge-nieto-nosotros-somos-el-desastre-la-hora-de-afrontar-las-emergencias
3 Specifically, the study entailed analysis of peer-reviewed and grey literature; formal laws, policies, plans and institutional frameworks; institutional websites; 
and media coverage of DRM activities and disaster events along with semi-structured and unstructured interviews of representatives of government agencies, 
the private sector, and NGOs and conversations with varied professionals, researchers, and citizens involved in Peru’s DRM efforts.
Peru is one of the planet’s most vulnerable nations to the destruc-
tive impacts of the El Niño phenomenon. In the months preceding 
the onset of the widely forecasted and heavily publicized 2015-16 
El Niño, the Peruvian government declared much of the country 
in a state of emergency and invested nearly $US 1.5 billion in 
risk-reduction, emergency-preparedness, and disaster-response 
activities. The 2015-16 event, however, never surpassed moderate 
intensity in Peru and caused relatively minor impacts. Then in Jan-
uary 2017, the rapid and unforeseen development of a “coastal 
El Niño”1 brought heavy rainfall and widespread flooding to the 
country’s Pacific slope. Despite the substantial preparations under-
taken just a year earlier, this 2017 event exposed critical gaps in 
the nation’s disaster-preparedness and response capacities, and, 
by late April, the event had produced damages comparable to the 
severe El Niño disasters of 1982-83 and 1997-98. The President of 
the Council of Ministers, Fernando Zavala, described the situation 
as “anomalous” and stated that “definitively, we are not prepared 
as a country for this type of event,” while the Minister of Defense, 
Jorge Nieto, suggested that Peru’s “institutions had to work more 
closely together to attend to the population, and especially to its 
poorest members.”2
In the context of Peru’s recurrent and devastating El Niño events, 
this report analyzes the recent history of the phenomenon’s im-
pacts in Peru, along with the evolution of institutions and strate-
gies for reducing the risks of such disasters. The study is particu-
larly interested in the measures implemented prior to the 2015-16 
El Niño, including how they were shaped by lessons from earlier 
events (especially the 1997-98 El Niño) and why they did not do 
more to reduce the impacts of the 2017 event. 
The study has been conducted through a combination of desk-
based research, institutional analysis, and key-informant inter-
views3 and is informed by and structured around the Post Event Re-
view Capability (PERC) methodology to disaster forensics (Keating 
et al. 2016; Venkateswaran et al. 2015). In contrast to prior PERC 
studies that analyzed discrete disaster events, this study examines 
recent El Niño events in Peru broadly (focusing especially on 1997-
98 and 2015-16) and features more detailed analysis of the insti-
tutional context around DRM in the country, with attention to how 
recent post-event learning has influenced current DRM strategies. 
Additionally, this study adds a projective component to the exist-
ing PERC literature through the consideration of several scenarios 
to envision the potential outcomes of distinct DRM-development 
trajectories for the year 2030.  
The report is structured in the following manner: the first section 
provides an overview of the physical context of El Niño-related 
risk and impacts in Peru, the second section introduces important 
sectoral vulnerabilities to these impacts, the third section discuss-
es the evolving institutional context for DRM in Peru, the fourth 
section provides an overview of the principal measures taken in 
preparation for the 2015-16 El Niño, the fifth section offers key 
insights from the analysis into the effectiveness of these measures 
and related challenges to El-Niño DRM, the sixth section presents 
the forward-looking scenario-based component, and the final sec-
tion highlights a set of recommendations for building resilience 
to future El Niño events and improving DRM effectiveness more 
generally in Peru.
7THE PHYSICAL CONTEXT OF  
EL NIÑO RISK IN PERU
The El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is a coupled oceanic- 
atmospheric phenomenon in the tropical Pacific region that pro-
duces variations in wind patterns, sea-surface temperatures, and 
precipitation levels over an approximately 2-7 year timescale and 
is credited with being the planet’s strongest source of inter-annual 
climatic variability (Cane 2005). ENSO is best known for the effects 
of its warm phase, El Niño, which is characterized by a weakening 
of the easterly trade winds and a strong decline in the upwelling 
of cold, nutrient-rich waters off the western coast of central South 
America, leading to warmer-than-average sea-surface and atmos-
pheric temperatures in the region. These higher temperatures drive 
increased convection and heavy rains on the usually arid northern 
Peruvian coast (Figure 1). During some El Niño events, an intensi-
fication of the annual rainy season also occurs in the central high-
lands (e.g. 1997-98) and drought conditions may develop in the 
southern highlands (e.g. 1982-83) (CAF 2000).
Evidence of El Niño-related impacts in contemporary Peru dates 
back centuries, and of the dozens of documented events at least 
nine are described as being of very strong or extraordinary in-
tensity4 (Figure 2) (Quinn et al. 1987). During such events, the 
greatly enhanced precipitation regimes generate damages directly 
and through riverine flooding, landslides, and debris flows (known 
locally as huaicos) that are triggered in steep, unstable terrain. In 
the 1997-98 El Niño, for example, official reports indicate that in-
tense rains, flooding, and huaicos accounted for 75% of the 1301 
destructive events recorded (Table 1). These impacts have created 
significant challenges for Andean and coastal cultures in this re-
gion for millennia, and over the last two centuries, El Niño events 
have contributed to major upheavals in Peruvian economy and 
society, including catastrophic impacts on the guano industry, the 
anchovy fishery, and coastal and highland agriculture (Thorp and 
Bertram, 1978; Ferradas 2015). In recent decades, severe events 
in 1982-83 and 1997-98 have taken many lives and generated 
billions of dollars in damages (CAF 2000; Ferradas 2000).
 
4 The seminal review paper by Quinn et al. (1987) referenced here uses the description very strong for the highest intensity El Niño events documented.  
The Peruvian forecasting agency ENFEN uses the term extraordinary. In this report, this strongest category of events is referred to as severe or extraordinary.
Figure 1: Precipitation anomalies during January-March 1998.
Data: SENAMHI. 
Figure 2: “Very stong” El Niño events documented in 
the historical record (Quinn et al. 1987; INDECI 2015, 2017).
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8Peru’s physical geography and hydrography contribute importantly 
to the damages that El Niño-related weather phenomena gen-
erate. Although Peru is a relatively water-rich country in general, 
the country’s western slope is extremely arid, receiving less than 
2% of the nation’s total freshwater reserves while concentrating 
approximately 60% of the national population and 70% of the 
country’s GDP production (Peru 2009). The hydrologic regime in 
this region is also highly seasonal, with surface-water flows in 
many westward-flowing rivers restricted to the tropical rainy sea-
son (~October-April). Additionally, many of these rivers and their 
tributaries feature steep gradients in their upper reaches along 
with high levels of bare ground or degraded vegetation cover and 
are thus especially prone to huaicos and flash flooding (Photo 1). 
Nevertheless, given the limited water resources available in the 
region, much human settlement has occurred adjacent to major 
water sources, often without attention to the flood hazards gener-
ated by relatively infrequent severe El Niño events.
 
While El Niño events in Peru are recurrent, the timing and intensity 
of specific events remain impossible to predict precisely, and the 
spatial distribution of impacts is highly variable between events. 
Although the accuracy of ENSO forecasting has improved consider-
ably over recent decades (Chen et al. 2004), continued uncertainty 
regarding the intensity and distribution of effects poses substantial 
challenges to preparedness. In light of these challenges, the im-
pacts of prior events have been used to guide preparatory meas-
ures, but this approach is only partially effective. For example, risk 
reduction measures undertaken for the 1997-98 El Niño based on 
impact patterns from the 1982-83 event did not include prepa-
rations for the ensuing catastrophic flooding on the central coast 
but did lead to measures for managing drought impacts that nev-
er developed in the southern highlands (CAF 2000). In 2015-16, 
expectations of an El Niño of similar intensity to that of 1997-98 
(Figure 3) led to extensive preparations, but the severe event nev-
er developed in Peru. Most problematically, unlike the true warm 
phase of ENSO, which can now be detected and monitored sever-
al months in advance, the coastal El Niño phenomenon (like that 
which devastated Peru in 2017) comes with little to no forewarn-
ing, surprising forecasters, authorities, and the general public alike.
Table 1: Reported disasters by type in the 1997-98 El Niño
 (Adapted from CAF 2000).
Type of Event Frequency % of total events reported
National  
departments most affected
Intense rains 444 34
Apurímac, Ayacucho, Piura, La 
Libertad, Lambayeque, Tumbes
Flooding 297 23
Ancash, Cuzco, Lambayeque, 
Lima, La Libertad, Piura, San 
Martín Tumbes, Ica
Huaicos 229 18
Ancash, Arequipa, Lima, La 
Libertad
Landslides 188 14 Ayacucho, Loreto, San Martín
Others (e.g. drought,  
extreme cold, wind and 
electrical storms)
143 11
TOTAL 1301 100
9Photo 1: Arid riverbeds and steep, unstable hillsides may rapidly flood and
erode with even small amounts of localized rainfall.
Figure 3: Sea-surface height (SSH) anomalies from the El Niño events in 1997 and 2015 
indicating their similar evolution by early September of each year (Courtesy NASA/JPL-Caltech).
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5 See: Ministerial Resolution # 120-77-PM/ONAJ (June 7, 1977), Supreme Resolution # 053-97-PE (Sep. 12 1997), and Ministerial Resolution # 761-97-PE  
(Nov. 26, 1997).
6 See: http://www.senamhi.gob.pe/?p=0812 
El Niño Forecasting and Risk Assessment
In order to support improved ENSO analysis and forecasting, Peru 
established the Multisectoral Committee for the National Study of 
El Niño (ENFEN)5 in 1977. Currently, ENFEN brings together ex-
perts from the National Geophysical Institute (IGP), the National 
Meteorology and Hydrology Service (SENAMHI), the National Wa-
ter Authority (ANA), the National Maritime Institute (IMARPE), the 
Navy, and the National Institute of Civil Defense (INDECI). ENFEN 
publishes monthly analyses of ENSO conditions and indicators (e.g. 
sea-surface and air temperatures and wind anomalies)6, which 
help to inform the government’s preparation and response strat-
egies for particular El Niño events. 
In parallel to ENFEN’s continuous ENSO monitoring, INDECI has in 
recent years prepared risk scenarios for individual ENSO events and 
annual rainy seasons (e.g. INDECI 2015). These scenarios are based 
on the combination of a range of geographic, meteorological, and 
demographic data (see Box 1) and are designed to help pinpoint 
and prepare for disaster impacts before they develop.
Ongoing efforts to estimate El Niño hazard exposure in Peru un-
derscore the potential for severe events to impact a large propor-
tion of the national territory as well as the substantial uncertainty 
that remains around the distribution of impacts from individual 
events. Notably, the methodology employed in these risk scenarios 
entails little consideration of localized levels of vulnerability and 
resilience to hazards, which in turn reflects the dearth of detailed 
information on these factors in much of the country (INDECI 2015). 
Together, such information gaps, high levels of exposure, and the 
pervasive uncertainty around El Niño all highlight the critical need 
to incorporate DRM activities that build resilience to flooding and 
other El Niño impacts into the country’s long-term planning and 
development policies. 
An additional challenge to managing El Niño-related risks in Peru 
is the uncertainty around the relationship between El Niño and 
global climate change. The occurrence of several severe El Niño 
events in Peru since 1982-83 (including the 2017 coastal El Niño) 
is suggestive of an intensification of the phenomenon under a 
warming climate, and recent research corroborates this perspective 
(Wang et al. 2017). Nevertheless, there is still no clear consensus 
among the scientific community regarding this intensification, and 
the nature of the relationship continues to be a focus of inquiry 
(Takahashi and Dewitte 2016). Similarly, efforts to model changes 
in seasonal precipitation levels at regional scales in Peru under pro-
jected future climate change are inconclusive (Burek et al. 2016). 
This uncertainty further underscores the need for broad-reaching 
DRM strategies that support adaptive management capacities and 
resilience to a range of impacts and conditions. 
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Box 1
To provide exposure estimates for the 2015-16 El Niño, INDECI 
combined precipitation records and emergency statistics from the 
1997-98 El Niño with broader impact data on specific hydro-me-
teorological events registered between 2003-2015 in the National 
Information System for Prevention and Attention to Disasters (SIN-
PAD).7 On the basis of this analysis, INDECI determined that an area 
of approximately 671,946 km2 (~52% of the national territory) was 
exposed to potential effects from an extraordinary El Niño event in 
2015-16 (Figure 4, areas in beige). By combining these results with 
census-based demographic data, INDECI estimated a total exposed 
population of more than 11.8 million. 
To support the targeting of DRM activities, INDECI then identified 
priority areas with a high probability of impact by delineating zones 
based on: 1) frequency of reported impacts during the 1997-98 El 
Niño, 2) reported emergencies to the SINPAD between 2003 and 
2015, 3) population density, and 4) geographic criteria including 
the topography of watersheds and flood plains (Figure 4, areas in 
red). Under these additional criteria, it was estimated that a pop-
ulation of almost 9.4 million — nearly a third of the total popu-
lation — was at high risk from an extraordinary El Niño event in 
2015-16. Based on this same analysis, exposure estimates were 
provided for the housing, transportation, education, and heath sec-
tors (Table 2) (INDECI 2015).
Table 2: Estimates for sectoral exposure to an extraordinary 
El Niño in 2015-16 (INDECI 2015).
Population Housing Transportation Education Health
Exposure by 
sector
9.4 million 2.4 million homes
19,600 kms. of 
improved roads
39,000 schools
6,000 health 
facilities
Figure 4: Predicted hazard zones in an extraordinary El Niño 
event (beige areas) and priority zones for preparedness and 
response activities (red areas) (Courtesy INDECI).
Estimating Exposure to the Impacts of El Niño in 2015-16
Pacific Ocean
hazard zones
priority zones
7 See: http://sinpad.indeci.gob.pe/sinpadweb/  
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS AND 
SECTORAL VULNERABILITIES TO  
EL NIÑO IN PERU
Residents of Peru’s Pacific slope have long settled in close prox-
imity to the seasonal streams and few perennial rivers that flow 
from the Andes across the coastal plain. Given the region’s de-
sertic conditions, these populations have constructed and relied 
upon extensive water transfer, irrigation, and transportation 
works to support settlement, agriculture, and, more recently, in-
dustrial development. While El Niño-related hazards have long 
impacted these settlements and infrastructure works, prospective 
measures to address this recurrent but infrequent phenomenon 
remain incipient. This section examines the historic impacts and 
vulnerabilities of socio-economic sectors commonly affected by 
El Niño, focusing on sectors critical to the broadest portion of 
society (i.e. housing, water and sanitation, transportation, educa-
tion, and health). The analysis highlights recurrent impacts across 
multiple El Niño events and suggests that many sectoral vulner-
abilities have not been significantly reduced over the last several 
decades — while some have likely grown worse (Table 3). 
Table 3: Sectoral Damages for recent El Niño events. 
Data: CEPAL, CAF, INDECI.
2.
Sector 1982-83 1997-98
2017
(preliminary figures)
Population
• 512 deaths
• 1,304 injuries
• 1.27 million affected
• 366 deaths
• 1,053 injuries
• 531,104 affected
• 114 deaths
• 414 injuries
• 1.08 million affected
Transport Network
•  2,600 km. of improved  
roads damaged 
• 51 bridges destroyed
• 3,136 km. of improved roads 
damaged
• 370 bridges destroyed
• 6,614 km. of improved roads 
damaged
• 326 bridges destroyed
Housing
• 98,000 homes destroyed
• 111,000 homes damaged
• 48,563 homes destroyed
• 108,000 homes damaged
• 41,632 homes destroyed or 
uninhabitable
• 242,433 homes damaged
Education • 875 schools damaged • 2,873 schools damaged • 2,150 schools damaged
Health • 260 health posts damaged • 580 health posts damaged • 726 health posts damaged
Total Monetary Losses US$ 
3.28 billion
(1998 $)
3.5 billion
(1998 $)
Estimated ~6-9 billion  
(2017 $)
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Housing Sector 
Many of Peru’s cities and peri-urban spaces have been settled 
through rapid migration from rural areas and unplanned process-
es of urbanization. While early waves of migration in the middle 
of the 20th century settled extensive areas of undeveloped land 
adjoining Lima and a few of the country’s other largest cities, 
recent decades have seen continuing housing demand coupled 
with a lack of zoning controls drive the creation of new settle-
ments (asentamientos humanos) in increasingly hazardous spaces 
(Seminario and Ruiz 2008). Much of this settlement has occurred 
along periodically flooded and erodible reaches of watercourses 
(quebradas) and on unstable hillsides featuring high levels of ex-
posure to huaicos, especially under the heavy rainfall characteris-
tic of severe El Niño events (Photo 2).
The establishment of asentamientos humanos in these hazard- 
prone areas is frequently orchestrated by land traffickers who 
identify vacant spaces and plan their coordinated “invasion” by 
multiple households (Calderon et al. 2015; Seminario and Ruiz 
2008). Despite the illegality of such processes, municipal govern-
ments and other groups tasked with property titling often support 
these occupations — be it unwittingly or for political or material 
gain — through the granting of formal land titles (Calderon et 
al. 2015). In some cases, existing legislation (e.g. Law No 28687 
and Law No 29090) has even streamlined formal titling processes 
for residents occupying hazardous spaces (UN 2014; Calderon 
et al. 2015). 
Photo 2: Demand for inexpensive housing near urban areas drives  
households to occupy hazardous spaces like this huaico-prone valley outside Lima.
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Photo 3: Typical brick and mortar construction in 
the Rimac River valley.
In addition to the location of settlements, the materials used and 
processes by which many homes are constructed contribute to their 
vulnerability to El Niño impacts. Woven fiber (esteras) and cane 
reinforced with stucco (quincha) are common low-cost materials 
in coastal areas while adobe is common in both the highlands and 
the coastal desert. These locally sourced materials are especially 
prevalent in many rural areas and in the early stages of establish-
ment of asentamientos humanos, while simple brick and mortar 
construction is frequently used as homes are improved and made 
more permanent (Photo 3). In Peru in general, an estimated 80% 
of homes are self-constructed with little formal oversight regarding 
design specifications or compliance with building codes (Calderon 
et al. 2015).
In many areas the exposure and vulnerability of settlements is rec-
ognized but has gone unaddressed. For example, in parts of Piura, 
Sullana, and Lambayeque that were impacted by flooding during 
the 1997-98 El Niño, urban plans identifying physical risks and vul-
nerabilities existed prior to the event but their recommendations 
had not been implemented (CAF 2000). Similarly, investigations by 
the National Institute for Urban Development (INADUR) undertak-
en in 1997 found that in northern cities impacted by the 1982-
83 El Niño event, recommendations for risk reduction after that 
event had not been followed (CAF 2000). As a result, the 1997-98 
El Niño impacted many of the same areas heavily damaged in 
1982-83. A similar pattern is currently re-emerging in areas that 
were impacted by the 1997-98 event and again by the 2017 event.8 
8 See: http://www.laindustria.pe/detallenoticias.php?codarticulo=5797
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Water and Sanitation Sector
Potable water and sanitation systems are one of the infrastructural 
elements most frequently and severely impacted by El Niño-related 
flooding. While the coverage of these systems has expanded mark-
edly over the last several decades, especially in urban contexts, the 
access of the poorest sectors of the population to improved wa-
ter and sanitation infrastructure often remains precarious. More-
over, existing systems have often been constructed in ways that 
leave them vulnerable to flooding impacts (Photo 4) (CAF 2000). 
By design, intake and treatment infrastructure for potable water 
must often be located in flood-exposed watercourses, and water 
transport infrastructure (e.g. canals, aqueducts, and pipes) fre-
quently traverses steep, erosion-prone hillsides or may be located 
on bridges or under watercourses where it is vulnerable to high 
flows.9 Increased turbidity due to heavy sediment loads transported 
by huaicos and by rivers at flood stage also impact water quality 
and damage infrastructure.10 Surface-water drainage networks and 
sanitation systems — where they exist at all — are also frequently 
overwhelmed by heavy runoff and suffer from a lack of regular 
maintenance, which predisposes them to clogging and overflow. 
While substantial funding was directed to water and sanitation 
service providers for the implementation of corrective measures 
and preparedness activities in the months prior to forecasted El 
Niño events (e.g. 1997-98 and 2015-16), there is a need to shift 
from these short-term interventions towards the development of 
less vulnerable infrastructure and continuous maintenance regimes 
(cf. CAF 2000).
Photo 4: Water and sewage lines exposed by 
flash-flooding-induced erosion in early 2017.
9 Examples include the collapse in the 1997-98 event of the Simon-Rodriguez Bridge over the Chira River that destroyed the pipe transporting potable water 
to Talara and damage in 2017 to the canal infrastructure of the CHAVIMOCHIC irrigation project that supplies water to Trujillo. 
10 In 2017, high turbidity in the Rimac River led to several days of water cuts throughout the capital city of Lima: http://larepublica.pe/impresa/sociedad/ 
858023-trabajadores-de-sedapal-intensifican-labores-de-limpieza-del-rio-rimac
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Flooding impacts on the water and sanitation sectors also contrib-
ute to a range of secondary impacts. These include interruptions in 
the provision of potable water that increase the consumption of 
contaminated water and the prevalence of waterborne illnesses: 
for example, confirmed cases of cholera (41,717) in 1998 were 
1000% greater than in the two years prior (CAF 2000). Similarly, 
the failure of drainage and sewage systems often leads to con-
taminated standing water that pollutes pristine water sources and 
creates breeding grounds for mosquitoes and diseases like lepto-
spirosis. As a result, after major flooding events, outbreaks of water 
and vector-borne diseases including malaria and dengue11 have 
occurred along with increased prevalence of skin, eye, and respira-
tory infections.
Transportation Sector
Peru’s road network has expanded substantially over recent dec-
ades, greatly increasing connectivity across the country’s varied 
and rugged topography. Much of this transportation network, how- 
ever, traverses steep and unstable terrain or runs in close parallel to 
watercourses and is extremely vulnerable to the impacts of severe El 
Niño events and heavy rainfall in general (Photo 5). In the 1997-98 
event, for example, more than 3,100 kilometers of improved road-
ways were damaged and 370 bridges collapsed in the country, and 
the reconstruction and rehabilitation of this infrastructure cost an 
estimated US$686 million (CAF 2000). Damages in the transporta-
tion sector also frequently compound impacts in other sectors due 
to problems of isolated populations and difficulties in delivering 
critical and time-sensitive goods and services.
Photo 5: Railway and road damage from erosion along 
the Rimac River in 2017.
11 Since 2016, the mosquito-borne Zika virus has also emerged as a concern, especially in northern Peru.
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Preparations in the transport sector for recent El Niño events have 
focused on short-term interventions such as clearing streambeds 
and drains upstream of and adjacent to bridges and roadways and 
establishing protective infrastructure in critical areas. While these 
measures have mitigated impacts in select locations, the need to 
expand such efforts and undertake them more consistently is press-
ing. Additionally, since at least the 1982-83 El Niño event, recom-
mendations have been made regarding the modification of design 
criteria for hazard-prone transport infrastructure to accommodate 
the precipitation and discharge levels of severe El Niño events rath-
er than lower intensity flood events (e.g. with recurrence intervals 
of 25-50 years) but have gone unheeded (CAF 2000). 
Health Sector 
Despite being a critical component of the nation’s disaster- 
response system, health-sector infrastructure is often located in 
hazard-prone locations, and direct and indirect impacts on health 
facilities may have broad-reaching effects on local abilities to re-
spond during and after disasters. During prior El Niño events severe 
rainfall, flooding, and huaicos have damaged health posts and hos-
pitals, although these facilities have often continued to function 
in at least basic capacities (CAF 2000). In the 1997-98 event, for 
example, an estimated 580 health facilities at the national level 
were significantly impacted or destroyed, and preliminary reports 
from the 2017 event suggest that more than 700 health facilities 
were damaged (INDECI 2017). While access to health care facilities 
at the national level has improved in recent decades, it remains dif-
ficult in many rural and remote areas and, during disaster events, is 
further complicated by damages to transport infrastructure. Limited 
staff and equipment in existing facilities also lead to challenges 
in responding simultaneously to disaster impacts and the ordinary 
healthcare demands of the population (CAF 2000).
Education Sector
In recent decades, the number of educational facilities in Peru has 
grown substantially, yet much of this infrastructure has been con-
structed to specifications or with materials vulnerable to intense 
rainfall and flooding (e.g. low-quality roofing materials) or in haz-
ard-prone locations (CAF 2000). During the 1997-98 El Niño, for 
example, a reported 2,873 educational facilities were damaged, 
5% of which required complete relocation due to the unsuitabil-
ity of their locations. Despite such shortcomings, during El Niño 
events and other disasters these facilities have frequently served as 
shelters for displaced populations. While such shelters are critical, 
the reliance on educational facilities for this service has led to the 
deterioration of infrastructure and educational materials as well 
as extended breaks in instruction (CAF 2000). Preliminary figures 
from the 2017 event indicate that more than 2150 schools were 
impacted, with more than 150 facilities destroyed or left unusable, 
and in many parts of the country extended recesses in instruction 
occurred due to weather-related hazards and infrastructural dam-
ages (INDECI 2017).12
12 See: http://elcomercio.pe/lima/nino-costero-300-mil-escolares-podran-iniciar-clases-411697
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PERU’S EVOLVING INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT FOR DISASTER RISK  
MANAGEMENT
Despite Peru’s long history of El Niño and other disasters (Carey 
2010; Ferradas 2015; Seiner 2001), institutional development for 
DRM in the country remained incipient through the 20th century, 
with efforts focused largely on emergency response to individual 
events. By late 2010, however, an integrated vision of DRM was ex-
plicitly designated a priority in the national policy agenda (Acuerdo 
Nacional No 32), and by early 2011, Law No 29664 was passed 
to found the National System for Disaster Risk Management (SI-
NAGERD), which provides the formal institutional structure for an 
integrated DRM strategy combining prospective, corrective, and 
reactive DRM measures.
To advance this integrated strategy, SINAGERD incorporates diverse 
actors from across governmental levels and sectors (Figure 5). At 
the head of the system is the Presidency of the Council of Ministers 
(PCM) with a key role in directing, supervising, and coordinating 
national DRM actions. Beneath the PCM, two national-level organ-
izations within the Ministry of Defense are tasked with directing 
the technical aspects of DRM policy and managing related informa-
tional resources. One of these organizations is INDECI, which con-
tinues its role overseeing activities related to disaster preparation, 
response, and rehabilitation. Reflecting the country’s longstanding 
focus on reactive disaster response, INDECI has existed in the Pe-
ruvian bureaucracy for more than four decades and currently has 
a decentralized presence through offices in each of the country’s 
26 political regions and through a network of Regional and Local 
Emergency Operation Centers (COERs and COELs). To complement 
INDECI, the National Center for the Estimation, Prevention, and 
Reduction of Disaster Risks (CENEPRED) oversees prospective and 
corrective DRM measures as well as reconstruction processes. Es-
tablished in 2011, CENEPRED is a centralized institution based in 
Lima, with a mandate to coordinate with regional and local-level 
3.
Figure 5: Institutional map showing key actors in 
the National System for Disaster Risk Management (SINAGERD).National Council for DRM 
(CONAGERD)
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governments through formal DRM working groups (discussed in 
further detail below). Originally ascribed to the PCM, CENEPRED 
was incorporated into the Ministry of Defense in early 2017 in an 
effort to improve the efficiency of SINAGERD.
SINAGERD also incorporates two high-level advisory bodies to the 
PCM. The National Council for Disaster Risk Management (CON-
AGERD) serves as the highest-level political decision maker and 
strategist in SINAGERD, and is composed of the President of the 
Republic (who presides over the council), ministers from nine dif-
ferent ministries (see Figure 5), and a representative of INDECI, 
who serves as the Technical Secretary. Notably, there is no perma-
nent representative of sub-national governments or of the private 
sector or civil society on CONAGERD, though the law stipulates 
that additional participants may be convened to the council as nec-
essary. The National Center for Strategic Planning (CEPLAN) also 
coordinates directly with the PCM in order to incorporate DRM pri-
orities into the Strategic Plan for National Development. 
Adding further complexity to the governance of SINAGERD is the 
fact that much of the DRM agenda’s implementation has histor-
ically been and remains in the hands of various public ministries 
(e.g. Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Housing, Construction, and 
Sanitation; Ministry of Education; and Ministry of Health). These 
ministries have their own internal governing structures and insti-
tutional cultures that add to the challenges in coordination and 
integration in the DRM sector. While inter-ministerial groups such 
as the PCM and CONAGERD provide formal spaces for integration 
in high-level planning, achieving coordination in the day-to-day ac-
tivities of these large siloed bureaucracies remains complex and in-
complete. Of the varied ministries involved, the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (MEF) plays a particularly critical role in DRM strategy 
through its control of fiscal mechanisms and spending oversight.
Despite the centralized character of much of SINAGERD, under 
the system’s subsidiarity principle, regional and local-level govern-
ments are designated as the principal executors of DRM activities. 
Under this principle, decisions should be made at the lowest level 
possible and national-level intervention should occur only when 
the capacities of subnational-level actors are surpassed. DRM re-
sponsibilities should be organized at subnational levels by working 
groups (grupos de trabajo) and centers of emergency operations 
(COERs and COELs) organized at both regional and municipal 
scales. These groups are tasked with the evaluation of disaster risks 
and social vulnerabilities and with the development of formal plans 
to reduce or respond to these risks.13 
Additional groups incorporated in SINAGERD by law include the 
Armed Forces and National Police, who play key roles in disaster 
preparedness and response activities. The law also explicitly in-
cludes the “participation of private entities and civil society,” in-
cluding universities, diverse corporate sectors, NGOs, and volunteer 
organizations like the Red Cross.
 
Policies and funding supporting  
DRM in Peru
Peru’s first National Disaster Risk Management Plan 2014-2021 
(PLANAGERD) provides clear guidelines and indicators for the 
implementation of the country’s DRM strategy, and a variety of 
additional laws and policies support the plan’s objectives. Some 
of the most important—if insufficiently implemented—supporting 
legislation includes policies targeted at landscape-level planning 
and zoning to prevent and reduce settlement and infrastructure 
construction in hazardous areas. For example, the National Water 
Authority is responsible for delineating buffer zones (faja marginal) 
around riverbeds and other watercourses, which are some of the 
foremost hazard zones in the country (see Box 2). Landscape-scale 
planning and zoning processes (ordenamiento territorial) have also 
been formally established, with oversight divided between the Min-
istry of the Environment and the Ministry of Housing: the former 
is tasked with facilitating processes of territory-wide “ecological 
and economic zoning” while the latter focuses on organizing de-
velopment processes in urban contexts. Notably, however, neither 
of these ministries currently enforces binding zoning regulations. 
Numerous respondents highlighted this lack of effective zoning 
policy and the continued occupation of hazardous areas across the 
national territory as a central challenge to DRM implementation.
To begin to address the extensive settlement of risk-prone spaces, 
the Ministry of Housing has recently modified legislation governing 
property formalization to prohibit the issuing of titles in zones of 
immitigable risk. In 2012 Peruvian policymakers also passed Law No 
29869 governing the relocation of populations inhabiting zones of 
immitigable risks.14 This legislation establishes the formal process 
through which the analysis and determination of such risks and 
13 DRM working groups have been established in all 26 regional governments while their creation at lower levels is less developed. Respondents insisted, 
however, that the formal establishment of these working groups does not ensure effectiveness or even sustained action on their part, and it was suggested 
that national-level institutions could do more to support the continued actions of sub-national working groups.
14 Article 4 of Law No 29869 defines zones of immitigable risk as “zones where there is the probability that the population or its livelihoods will suffer  
damages or losses due to the impacts of a hazard, and where the implementation of mitigation measures results in greater cost or complexity than relocating  
the respective households or infrastructure.”
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Box 2
Most of the time, the middle reaches of Peru’s Rimac River water-
shed are difficult to imagine as a flood-risk hotspot. Located in the 
arid transition zone between the desert metropolis of Lima (pop. 
~11 million) and the foothills of the western Andes, the municipal-
ities of Ate, Chaclacayo, and Lurigancho-Chosica have grown from 
lightly populated agricultural and recreational spaces bordering the 
river into a bustling urban corridor. This transformation has been 
driven by extensive settlement of the Rimac River valley and the 
steep, rocky canyons (known as quebradas) nearby. Yet despite the 
region’s desert façade, this zone is vulnerable to riverine flooding 
and streambed erosion in the main Rimac valley as well as to debris 
flows caused by flash flooding (known as huaicos) within and below 
the adjacent quebradas. These hazards, which strike during some 
El Niño years and annual rainy seasons, imperil local residents and 
their assets and disrupt critical transportation routes. 
Flood risks in the middle Rimac basin are tied to the region’s geo-
physical conditions and hydrologic processes, but this is only part 
of the story. Risks in this region are also closely linked to a history 
of settling in hazard-prone spaces. These occupation patterns un-
derscore how a lack of land-use planning, zoning, and enforce-
ment coupled with limited public awareness of hazards can lead to 
rapid growth in disaster risk. In this context, the National Water Au-
thority (ANA) is currently working to disseminate and retroactively 
enforce the faja marginal (a buffer zone around the river corridor 
where settlement is prohibited) along hazard-prone stretches of 
the Rimac. Yet, despite the risks local populations face, this process 
has often been met with resistance from residents concerned with 
losing access to the lands they inhabit.
Fears of displacement and a refusal to recognize the faja marginal 
in one part of Ate, however, have recently given way to improved 
cooperation between residents and ANA. In this area, locals who 
have long lived next to the river — in some cases for four dec-
ades — but lack formal titles for their lands are designing plans for 
alternative uses for the river’s buffer zone, including public green 
spaces and a walking boulevard. By respecting the faja marginal in 
this way, these residents hope to avoid encroachment on the flood 
zone while improving their communal space and receiving support 
for the formal titling of their lands from ANA and other government 
institutions.
Collaborating to create room for the Rimac River in Ate 
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subsequent voluntary or involuntary relocation should occur, divid-
ing key responsibilities between relevant local and regional govern-
ments, CENEPRED, INDECI, and the Ministry of Housing. Despite 
these advances, the laws have yet seen little implementation and the 
definition of what constitutes immitigable risk remains contentious 
in many settings, while the conditions of relocation and the politics 
surrounding them are also complex and conflicted (see Box 3). How-
ever, in the wake of the 2017 coastal El Niño, relocation has been 
stressed by authorities and DRM experts as a necessary component 
of the reconstruction process, thus the relocation law and related 
legislation are likely to receive further tests in the near future.
To support the implementation of PLANAGERD and related policies, 
a variety of funds for financing DRM measures have been estab-
lished. These mechanisms are overseen by the PCM and the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance (MEF) and include one-time allocations 
for specific initiatives; annually reoccurring budget lines and spe-
cial incentive programs designed to fund prospective and corrective 
measures at all levels of government (e.g. PP 0068); funds from min-
ing-sector taxes to be used for relocation; and contingency funds and 
a fiscal stabilization fund for preparation, response, rehabilitation, 
and reconstruction activities related to specific disaster events (UN 
2014). Yet despite substantial increases in DRM funding in recent 
years (Figure 6), a principal concern of national-level authorities and 
DRM practitioners is the lack of capacity at regional and local levels 
to effectively access and use such resources. According to respond-
ents, this inability to take full advantage of DRM-specific financing 
is grounded in factors including a continued lack of awareness of 
the funding’s availability and purpose and limited technical capac-
ities at subnational levels for accessing public budget programs. 
Both of these factors are made worse by problems of frequent staff 
turnover at lower governmental levels and an entrenched vision of 
DRM as emergency response rather than prospective and corrective 
long-term planning. Additionally, multiple respondents underscored 
problems of inefficient and corrupt uses of DRM funding, particularly 
under formal declarations of emergency, when oversight and audit-
ing of public spending are less stringent.
To summarize, the evolving policies and institutional and financial 
context supporting DRM in Peru illustrate a transition away from 
a system focused solely on emergency response towards a more 
integrated approach. Nevertheless, many authorities and practition-
ers stress that substantial gaps still exist between the DRM policies 
enshrined in law and the grounded practices of the varied groups 
tasked with their implementation (cf. UN 2014). In this context of 
gradual transformation, the El Niño events of 2015-16 and 2017 
provide concrete circumstances in which to examine the country’s 
existing DRM practices and their outcomes. The following sections 
of the report turn to a discussion of the measures taken in prepa-
ration for the highly publicized 2015-16 event and provide prelim-
inary reflections on how these measures influenced the outcomes 
of the 2017 event.
Figure 6: Funding for DRM measures to different levels of government under the Budget 
Program PP0068 in millions of Peruvian Soles (PEN) (2017 amounts are preliminary). Source: MEF.
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Box 3
In the Municipality of Lurigancho-Chosica, located in the Rimac 
River valley outside Lima, government authorities declared a neigh-
borhood at the base of the Carosio quebrada as a zone of immitiga-
ble risk and mandated the relocation of numerous households after 
huaicos in late March 2015 killed at least 7 people and displaced 
dozens of families. Yet most of the population refused the order, 
preferring to stay in their homes and face the huaico risk rather 
than accept the conditions of the relocation process offered by the 
government.
Given the unwillingness of the population to be relocated and the 
forecast for a severe El Niño event in 2015-16, the National Water 
Authority (within the Ministry of Agriculture) sponsored the instal-
lation of numerous geodynamic barriers capable of arresting the 
solid material entrained by huaicos in the steep valleys above the 
community in Carosio and neighboring quebradas. These barriers, 
which cost about one million soles each (~US$330,000), initially 
drew harsh criticism from some local residents and politicians who 
found them excessively costly in comparison to the typical cement 
and rock retaining walls that had been periodically constructed and 
subsequently destroyed by earlier huaicos.
Given the lack of substantial El Niño impacts in central Peru in 
2015-16, none of these geodynamic barriers were tested that 
first year, and some of the structures suffered from the theft of 
components over the following year. Nevertheless, with the heavy 
rainfall and numerous huaicos that struck the region in early 2017, 
the barriers’ value was illustrated as they filled with material that 
would have otherwise flowed downstream into neighborhoods, 
damaging homes, blocking roadways, and perhaps taking addi-
tional lives. Once their effectiveness had been proven, neighboring 
areas where they had not been installed began to request them, 
and in mid-2017, the viability of a more extensive implementation 
of the infrastructure was being evaluated.
As these geodynamic barriers proved in 2017, effective DRM infra-
structure can play an important role in protecting populations and 
assets from foreseeable hazards. However, where future hazards 
might overwhelm such infrastructure due to changes in intensity or 
a lack of ongoing maintenance, such infrastructure may also gener-
ate greater risks over the long-term if it creates a sense of security 
that leads to further settlement or asset build-up in hazard-prone 
 
spaces. As a result of this potential, careful analysis of the long-
term efficacy of investing in protective infrastructure versus im-
plementing other forms of corrective or prospective DRM — such 
as hazard zoning or relocation — is necessary. In the wake of the 
2017 coastal El Niño, such analysis should be undertaken in Chosi-
ca and neighboring communities to determine where geodynamic 
barriers are an appropriate long-term DRM solution and where 
risks are such that acceptable relocation strategies should instead 
be prioritized and negotiated with local populations.
Risk-reducing infrastructure versus relocation: 
seeking long-term DRM solutions in Chosica
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PREPARATIONS FOR THE 2015-16  
EL NIÑO IN PERU
By mid-2015, Peru’s ENFEN and other El Niño forecasters world-
wide began to warn of a significant global El Niño event for the 
upcoming austral summer. These forecasts triggered Peru’s central 
government to proactively declare parts of 14 regions in a state of 
emergency in early July due to the event’s potential impacts during 
the upcoming rainy season. Over the next several months, addi-
tional declarations would bring a total of 89 % of all municipalities 
in the country under a state of emergency, and by late August it 
was suggested that the intensity of the event could rival those of 
1982-83 and 1997-98 (INDECI 2015). 
In early September a “Decree of Urgency” (D.U. No 004-2015) 
granted authority to redistribute annual budget allocations and 
implement additional financial mechanisms to support further 
preparedness activities throughout the country. This decree also 
created the National Council for Management of El Niño Risk 
(CONAGER-FEN), consisting of nine ministers and presided over 
by the Minister of Agriculture, to serve as the chief decision- 
making and policy-coordinating entity during the 2015-16 event. 
In October, CONAGER-FEN released a detailed plan (CONAGER- 
FEN 2015) outlining the principal actions to be taken across gov-
ernmental sectors and geographic regions in preparation for the 
event, with a total budget allocation of more than 4.85 billion 
soles (~US$ 1.5 billion) (Figure 7).
This substantial funding included existing allocations from 2014 
and 2015 for risk reduction and preparedness activities relevant 
to El Niño, as well as additional support for emergency response 
and rehabilitation. As had been the case in the 1997-98 El Niño 
event, the predominant preparedness activities involved using 
heavy machinery to clear debris and channelize flows in or be-
side river courses or irrigation canals, along with the reinforce-
ment and construction of protective infrastructure in some risk-
prone watersheds (Photo 6). These activities were led in rural 
and peri-urban areas by the Ministry of Agriculture and regional 
governments, while in urban settings the Ministry of Housing 
typically oversaw them.
4.
Figure 7: Budget allocations across government sectors for DRM measures related to the 2015-16 El Niño. 
Total budget allocation exceeded 4.85 billion Peruvian Soles (PEN) (~US$1.5 billion) (CONAGER-FEN 2015).
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The importance of these watershed- and infrastructure-focused 
measures is understandable in contexts where development in 
and adjacent to flood-prone watercourses is common. Neverthe-
less, the prevalence of these activities in the portfolio of short-term 
preparatory strategies for two consecutive El Niño events suggests 
that previous lessons regarding the need for more consistent and 
routine maintenance of river courses and infrastructure coupled 
with more restrictive zoning policies are yet to be taken up by 
authorities. Questions also arise as to the long-term benefits of 
spending large sums on ad hoc river clearing, channelization, and 
protective works that may create an unwarranted sense of security 
in vulnerable populations. Additionally, respondents underscored 
that these watershed-focused activities — especially stream clear-
ing, widening, and channelization efforts — were highly suscep-
tible to corruption due to the difficulties in verifying factors such 
as the length of time worked, the amount of fuel used by heavy 
machinery, and the extent of riverbed treated. Such problems were 
reportedly made worse under the declarations of emergency when 
spending controls were relaxed and the use of third-party opera-
tors in some cases led to significantly elevated costs for contracting 
heavy machinery and labor. 
The Ministries of Housing, Health, Education, and Transport also 
all received substantial funding for protection, repairs, and im-
provements to infrastructure vulnerable to heavy rains, flooding, 
and landslides (e.g. potable water and sanitation systems, schools, 
health posts and hospitals, and roads and bridges). Yet, as in 
the case of the watershed-level interventions discussed above, 
respondents suggested that these infrastructure improvements 
would have been more effective had they been undertaken on a 
routine basis instead of in the months immediately preceding the 
forecasted event. Moreover, the vulnerability of much of this infra-
structure had been underscored during earlier flooding events, and 
explicit recommendations to address these problems after prior El 
Niño events were not implemented (CAF 2000).
Photo 6: Ongoing efforts to open the channel of the 
Rimac River as flooding impacts intensified during early 2017.
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Photo 7: A Bailey bridge established in the wake of 
the 2017 coastal El Niño.
In complement to watershed and infrastructure-focused activities, 
authorities and civil society organizations at the national, regional, 
and local levels undertook diverse activities to support prepared-
ness for the general public and for entities responsible for disaster 
response. Much of this action entailed material preparations, for 
example the stockpiling of food, medicines and other basic sup-
plies in areas likely to be impacted. INDECI took a leading role in 
much of this work, coordinating with regional governments, and 
in some cases the private sector, to expand their network of stor-
age facilities for emergency supplies, while the Ministry of Housing 
used its recently established system of tambos (facilities in rural 
areas where a range of government services are concentrated) to 
stockpile supplies for rapid distribution to populations at risk of 
isolation from more centralized service provision. 
Recognizing the critical importance of maintaining access to po-
table water, the Ministry of Housing also provided financing and 
loans totaling nearly US$ 20 million to local water systems for the 
relocation and reinforcement of treatment plants and other infra-
structure, as well as the cleaning of sewage systems and storm- 
water drains (MVCS 2016). Additionally, the Ministry of Housing 
supplied eight portable water treatment systems along with cistern 
trucks to the departments of Tumbes, Piura, Lambayeque, and Am-
azonas — areas that suffered potable water shortages and relat-
ed disease outbreaks during the 1997-98 event — as well as five 
portable drain-cleaning systems (hydro-jets) for select water and 
sewage providers (MVCS 2016).
In addition to supplies and equipment, mobile infrastructure in-
cluding modular buildings to provide 500 temporary residences 
and 2000 temporary classrooms were acquired by the Ministries of 
Housing and Education respectively and distributed to vulnerable 
regions. The Ministry of Transport meanwhile acquired numerous 
temporary bridges (e.g. Bailey style, Photo 7) up to 60 meters in 
length and 151 new pieces of heavy machinery (i.e. dump trucks, 
front-end loaders, backhoes, etc.) for distribution to vulnerable 
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regions. This heavy machinery complemented similar equipment 
owned by the Ministries of Agriculture and Housing as well as by 
regional governments, but due to high demand in the period prior 
to the onset of the rainy season third-party providers were still re-
lied upon in some settings. Notably, while an emphasis was placed 
on insuring sufficient distribution of such equipment, respondents 
described coordination problems that in some cases led machinery 
to stand idle due to a lack of allocated funds for fuel supplies.
Substantial efforts were also undertaken across sectors and gov-
ernmental levels to prepare populations to effectively respond to 
disaster once it hit. These interventions were diverse, and targeted 
a wide range of authorities and citizens. One area of focus was in 
training emergency-response and search and rescue brigades. Such 
training was undertaken by INDECI and its decentralized COERs 
and COELs, the Volunteer Firefighters Association, diverse Minis-
tries (especially the Ministry of the Interior via the national police 
and the Ministry of Defense via the armed forces), and a range of 
NGOs working directly with civil society. In some instances, this 
training was coupled with the creation or dissemination of strate-
gies and contingency plans for specific groups and sectors. CENE-
PRED, for example, worked closely with the disaster-risk working 
groups in 14 priority regions to build teams, develop technical 
capacities, and formulate DRM plans.
Several additional strategies were used to build public awareness 
of physical risks and appropriate responses. For example, with sup-
port from the National Water Authority, both INDECI and CENEP-
RED worked to map high-risk zones and evacuation routes, with 
the resulting maps hosted on online platforms open to the public.15 
Many groups contributed to preparations for a series of drills and 
simulations of disaster and emergency response in the months pri-
or to the rainy season, and in some settings Early Warning Systems 
(EWS) were developed or implemented through the monitoring of 
meteorological and hydrologic conditions (e.g. by monitoring riv-
er levels at points upstream of vulnerable population centers or 
infrastructure). Additionally, training activities were undertaken by 
INDECI and some NGOs to prepare local authorities and civilians to 
complete the formal documentation of the post-disaster Evaluation 
of Damages and Analysis of Necessities (EDAN), which is a critical 
step in the dispersal of governmental aid through registration in 
the National Information System for Response and Rehabilitation 
(SINPAD).
15 See: http://sinadeci.indeci.gob.pe/VisorEvacuacion/index.html and http://sigrid.cenepred.gob.pe/sigrid/
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KEY INSIGHTS: EVALUATING RECENT 
EL NIÑO-RELATED DISASTER RISK 
MANAGEMENT IN PERU
Despite the widely publicized forecasts and extensive prepara-
tions for a severe event, the 2015-16 El Niño produced much 
less significant impacts than expected in Peru. The impacts re-
ported included minor flooding in Piura and Tumbes and localized 
drought impacts on agricultural production in the south of the 
country. While some public authorities pointed to the role that 
preparedness and corrective measures had played in minimizing 
impacts, many experts considered the 2015-16 El Niño a “non-
event” due to its weak to moderate intensity. In light of the lack 
of impacts, evaluation of the effectiveness of the varied measures 
taken in preparation for the event is difficult. Nevertheless, inter-
views with diverse public authorities involved in or peripheral to 
El Niño-related DRM activities in 2015-16 provide grounded per-
spectives on the effects of these measures as well as on the recent 
institutional developments in Peru’s DRM sector and what might 
be learned going forward. Additionally, the catastrophic impacts 
of the 2017 coastal El Niño provide opportunities to consider the 
effectiveness of measures undertaken the year before. While a de-
tailed consideration of the 2017 event is beyond the scope of this 
report, reflections based on media and governmental coverage of 
the event and conversations with DRM experts are offered where 
relevant. A forthcoming PERC report focused specifically on the 
impacts of the 2017 El Niño in Peru will expand considerably on 
the preliminary reflections regarding that event contained here.
1) The challenges of uncertainty and variability for fore-
casting and preparedness 
The ability to forecast El Niño-related dynamics at the global 
scale has improved markedly, but precise prediction of event 
intensity and impacts at regional to local scales remains a sig-
nificant challenge. The impacts of prior El Niño events can help 
target and structure DRM activities, but variability between 
events should be expected. 
Throughout the early stages of its development, the 2015-16 
El Niño event showed close alignment with conditions during 
1997-98, and experts around the globe — including from Peru’s 
ENFEN — warned of an event of potentially severe intensity. While 
damages in some regions (e.g. southern California) were substan-
tial, the fact that the event was not stronger in Peru contradict-
ed the forecasts of ENFEN and other experts. Given the status of 
El Niño indicators in mid-late 2015, our respondents concurred 
that utmost precaution was warranted on the part of ENFEN, and 
it was broadly perceived that the group had acted effectively in 
forecasting the event. One year later ENFEN’s forecasting efforts 
were called into question again as the 2017 coastal El Niño event 
rapidly developed with no forewarning. Here again, the group’s as-
sessments — based in continuous monitoring of standard El Niño 
indicators — were in-line with those of other international experts, 
none of whom predicted the event beforehand.16 
Rather than scientific error, the challenges in accurately forecast-
ing the events of 2015-16 and 2017 are indicative of the complex-
ity and uncertainty inherent to El Niño events, and especially to 
the infrequent and little-understood coastal El Niño phenomenon 
unique to the Peruvian and Ecuadorian coastline. This uncertainty 
underscores the critical need for development of prospective DRM 
measures that work towards building long-term resilience rather 
than a continued dependence on short-term corrective and pre-
paratory strategies. Moreover, “no regrets” solutions that contrib-
ute directly to national development goals regardless of disaster 
occurrence should be a priority. Such prospective and resilience- 
5.
16 In their report issued on January 16, 2017, ENFEN concluded that the probability of a weak coastal El Niño was 30%, while that of a moderate to extra- 
ordinary coastal event was only 1%. That same day, rainfall in the foothills outside of Lima produced a series of huaicos in the Rimac River Valley that dam-
aged homes and blocked roads. While such events occur in some El Niño years, they are also common during the annual rainy season and were not consid-
ered indicative of the developing coastal El Niño. One week later, however, ENFEN issued an update reporting that sea-surface temperatures off the northern  
Peruvian coast were rising rapidly and producing conditions conducive to a weak coastal El Niño that would continue to be monitored closely. By the first 
week of February, as intense rainfall in the north of the country began to generate widespread flooding, ENFEN issued a full alert for the coastal El Niño. 
For further detail regarding these reports see: http://www.senamhi.gob.pe/?p=0812
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focused approaches would also help to confront the high varia-
bility in the spatial and temporal distribution of impacts between 
different El Niño events that can make relying on past events — and 
especially single events — as guides for preparedness inefficient 
and potentially misleading. 
2) The need for inter-sectoral and multi-level institutional 
coordination for integrated DRM
The institutional context for DRM in Peru is shifting from a model 
focused largely on disaster response to an approach integrating 
corrective, prospective, and reactive measures and capacities across 
sectors and levels of government and society. This shift is well sup-
ported by formal laws and policies, yet significant implementation 
challenges in practice remain, particularly at subnational scales. 
Further incorporation of DRM planning into existing processes of 
watershed management and landscape planning is also needed.
The 2015-16 El Niño — and to a greater extent the 2017 event — 
have provided opportunities to observe the evolving institutional 
context for DRM in Peru in action. According to respondents, the 
forecasting of the 2015-16 event served as an important catalyst 
for enhanced coordination across the various components of SI-
NAGERD. For example, preparation for the 2015-16 event report-
edly helped divide and clarify some roles and responsibilities for 
the three principal DRM organizations at the national scale — the 
PCM, CENEPRED, and INDECI — whose roles had been redefined 
or created over the few years prior to the event and who experience 
some overlap in activities and authority. Similarly, the designation 
of the national council to oversee the preparation and response 
strategy (CONAGER-FEN) worked to bring diverse governmental 
ministries, with often distinct and at times competing objectives, 
together in a collaborative forum. However, as the threat from the 
2015-16 event declined, CONAGER-FEN was dissolved; a deci-
sion that some respondents suggested was counterproductive to 
maintaining institutional capacities for responding to the recurrent 
threat of El Niño. This dissolution does raise concerns about institu-
tional continuity and preparedness under conditions of surprise, as 
highlighted by the challenges in responding to the 2017 event. In 
light of the difficulties in 2017, it remains to be seen whether the 
permanent National Council of SINAGERD (CONAGERD) can fulfill 
the El Niño-specific advisory role of the ad-hoc CONAGER-FEN. 
The extensive DRM investments and activities in preparation for 
the 2015-16 event also tested institutional linkages and functions 
across the different levels of government, from national to regional 
to local scales. According to respondents, the process underscored 
that multi-level coordination and lower-level capacities remain the 
weakest aspects of SINAGERD and the country’s evolving DRM ef-
forts. These weaknesses reflect a historic concentration of resourc-
es and expertise for DRM at the level of the central government, 
and they are compounded by the relatively recent redesign of 
SINAGERD — a process initially and, to a large degree, still cen-
tered at the national level. While substantial efforts were under-
taken to train and prepare lower-level authorities in DRM-related 
processes in the months leading up to the 2015-16 rainy season 
(e.g. in the creation of emergency plans and the management of 
various DRM information platforms), only a relatively small per-
centage of all subnational governments could be included in these 
activities. To be effective at scale, such capacity building requires 
widespread and sustained action and engagement across govern-
mental levels as well as ongoing dissemination amongst personnel 
at lower levels. According to respondents, these activities remain 
significantly constrained by the frequent turnover in professional 
staff, especially at lower levels of government, and by the fact that 
DRM remains a peripheral and reactive activity in many contexts 
without adequate and permanently allocated staff resources.17
A final observation related to improving inter-sectoral and multi- 
level DRM coordination concerns the need for greater inclusion 
of DRM policy and planning in ongoing processes of integrated 
water resource management at the watershed scale (via water-
shed councils) and in landscape-level planning and zoning pro-
cesses (ordenamiento territorial). This suggestion was emphasized 
in the wake of the 1997-98 El Niño (CAF 2000), and since then 
formal multi-sectoral processes have been developed in both areas, 
with the former led by watershed councils assisted by the National 
Water Authority and the latter overseen by the Ministry of Envi-
ronment in conjunction with regional governments. These evolving 
processes are currently being conducted in diverse settings; and 
while they include varying degrees of attention to disaster risks 
and DRM, there remains significant potential to more explicitly and 
systematically incorporate risk assessments and DRM strategies 
into long-range planning and decision-making, especially at the 
watershed scale. 
17 While multiple respondents mentioned these issues at lower levels, it is important to note that our interviews were focused primarily with national-level 
authorities and actors. Additional interviews with a range of sub-national authorities would be useful in broadening the perspectives included in the study  
and examining whether subnational authorities view these problems in the same way as their national-level counterparts.
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3) The importance of capacity and oversight for DRM 
investments and implementation 
Funding for DRM activities in Peru has grown substantially over 
recent years, and financial mechanisms are in place to support the 
transition to a more integrated and prospective DRM approach. De-
spite such advances, there is currently limited capacity, especially in 
regional and local governments, for accessing these DRM-targeted 
funds and executing DRM projects. Additionally, it is important to 
address the problems of inefficient expenditure and corruption 
that worsen under conditions of formally declared “emergency,” 
when DRM funds are subject to less stringent oversight and ac-
countability in spending. Increased funding of DRM measures 
through standard budgeting procedures along with enhanced 
oversight of the use of emergency funds should improve efficiency 
and transparency.
Funding for DRM-related measures has increased dramatically 
since the creation of SINAGERD in 2011. For example, in the flag-
ship budget program for DRM (PP 0068), apportioned funds in-
creased from 62 million soles in 2011 to more than 3 billion soles 
in 2015. Despite such prodigious growth in spending on DRM, 
multiple respondents identified a lack of capacity on the part of 
authorities to effectively access these funds and execute projects as 
an ongoing limitation, especially at subnational levels. 
While funding for DRM interventions is principally directed by the 
MEF and the PCM, the sweeping “emergency” declarations in mid-
2015 relaxed controls on the dispersal and monitoring of public 
funds. According to a number of our respondents, this created con-
ditions for widespread inefficiencies in spending as well as outright 
corruption. Notably, as the impacts of the 2017 coastal El Niño 
began to accumulate, Peruvian President Pedro Kuczynski resisted 
a universal declaration of “emergency” out of an explicit effort to 
avoid fomenting corruption at levels of local government through 
less-controlled government spending.18 Reflecting on these issues, 
representatives from the MEF acknowledged that some inefficiency 
in spending had undoubtedly occurred with the disbursements of 
2015, but that such problems were typical for short-term contract-
ing, especially under significant time constraints. Respondents also 
affirmed that corruption, especially at regional and local levels, is a 
pervasive problem extending well beyond the DRM sector, and that 
sustained efforts by public authorities at all levels are required to 
address it. Within the DRM sector specifically, respondents under-
scored the need for increased oversight of government spending as 
part of SINAGERD’s development, as well as for a greater focus on 
prospective DRM measures undertaken over the long-term through 
programs like PP 0068 in lieu of ad-hoc measures.
4) Fomenting a culture of disaster preparedness and 
decentralized disaster response 
Although much DRM practice in Peru remains grounded in a long-
standing focus on response to individual disasters, there is a tran-
sition underway to a more integrated and comprehensive DRM 
approach. Currently, much of the progress in this area has been 
focused in the state institutions directly involved in DRM activities, 
most notably at the national level and to a lesser degree in subna-
tional institutions. Widespread dissemination of these approaches 
in ways that achieve changes in the broader institutional and cul-
tural context of the country will require the ongoing commitment 
of financial and human resources and extensive outreach and com-
munication across levels and sectors of the state bureaucracy as 
well as between government and society.
In the past, DRM in Peru has been viewed principally as the pur-
view of the police, armed forces, and civil defense groups acting in 
response to particular disasters. The creation of SINAGERD in 2011 
marks an important step in the transition to a more integrated 
vision of DRM incorporating broader society. Respondents noted 
that moving from this policy vision to widespread implementation 
is a long-term process, however, that remains incipient in most 
governmental sectors and segments of society. While activities re-
lated to preparation for the 2015-16 El Niño (e.g. citizens learning 
about early warning systems, evacuation routes, and basic first aid 
through workshops and drills or local governments learning how to 
use DRM-information platforms) provided significant opportunities 
for outreach and capacity building in disaster preparedness and re-
sponse, it was noted that to have long-term effects, these activities 
must be seen as part of a continuous process of DRM that extends 
beyond the threat of a single forecasted disaster into a culture of 
risk awareness and readiness. 
Respondents also emphasized that to be effective at the institu-
tional level, the work of SINAGERD must extend beyond the central 
institutions tasked with DRM into the full range of government 
18 See: http://larepublica.pe/politica/858074-ppk-declarar-todo-el-peru-en-emergencia-es-abrirle-la-puerta-la-corrupcion-video
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sectors and their quotidian activities — a process that will take 
time and involve incremental change in entrenched institutional 
cultures. Meanwhile at local levels, DRM activities must be seen as 
relevant and worthwhile for authorities and citizens rather than as 
an additional bureaucratic burden imposed by central authorities. 
While some concern was expressed that the lack of severe impacts 
from the highly publicized 2015-16 El Niño might have negative 
effects on overall willingness to prepare for disasters in the future, 
the impacts of the unforeseen 2017 event have likely reinforced 
the importance of such preparation in many contexts, underscoring 
the fact that disaster may strike at any time.
5) From “emergency” response to long-term resilience 
through corrective and prospective DRM 
Despite the country’s long history of disaster response coupled 
with sustained growth and stability in the national economy over 
recent years, the disaster-risk context in Peru has improved little for 
much of the population. This lack of progress on risk reduction is 
often linked to continued high levels of exposure and vulnerability, 
both for populations and infrastructure. In this context, integrating 
long-term corrective and prospective DRM actions into ongoing 
development planning and resource management processes is crit-
ical for future risk reduction. 
Prior El Niño events have highlighted the exposure of much of the 
national territory and population, as well as the underlying vul-
nerabilities of many households and infrastructure developments 
that increase disaster risks. Yet despite such lessons, planning and 
preparation for El Niño events in Peru have continued to be char-
acterized by short-term measures conducted only once events have 
been forecasted. For example, a substantial component of the DRM 
measures in both the 1997-98 and 2015-16 events focused on 
preparing watercourses and infrastructure for the impacts of heavy 
rainfall and flooding in the months immediately prior to the event’s 
predicted onset. During the 2015-16 El Niño, such interventions 
may have served to mitigate the event’s limited impacts. However, 
under the much stronger impacts of the 2017 event, significant in-
jury and loss of life and severe infrastructure impacts—including to 
housing, potable water and sewer systems, roads, bridges, schools, 
and health facilities — occurred on a scale comparable to that of 
both the 1982-83 and 1997-98 events. These impacts raise doubts 
over the degree to which learning occurred and was implemented 
after these earlier events and highlights the lack of durability of the 
preparedness measures undertaken in 2015-16.
Rehabilitation and reconstruction after the 2017 coastal El Niño 
provide an opportunity to systematically address these issues, and 
debates at the national level regarding reconstruction have focused 
on the need for long-term corrective and prospective DRM meas-
ures, especially regarding relocating populations and assets locat-
ed in zones of immitigable risk, with concomitant development of 
effective zoning regulations to avoid future occupation of these 
spaces. Additionally, the need to construct more disaster-resilient 
infrastructure to accommodate the precipitation and discharge lev-
els of severe El Niño events is once again being stressed. In light of 
the required shifts in DRM and development strategy, authorities 
have officially labeled the process as “reconstruction with chang-
es,” but building back in ways that ensure that the same exposure 
problems and patterns of vulnerability are not re-created will be an 
expensive and complicated long-term endeavor, with issues around 
relocation being especially contentious. 
Despite such challenges, the legal and policy context in Peru for 
comprehensive DRM approaches has improved markedly. In par-
ticular, DRM has begun to be incorporated into landscape and 
watershed-scale planning processes and some progress has been 
made in establishing laws regulating zones of high and immitiga-
ble risk. Respondents noted, however, that in most contexts these 
laws have not yet been implemented effectively due to factors 
including limited institutional capacities and resources, the lack 
of political will, corruption, and resistance from residents. As one 
interviewee said, “the policies are very good on paper but no one 
follows them.” Such obstacles emphasize that not only will the 
development of long-term corrective and prospective DRM meas-
ures be extremely costly and logistically complex, but they will also 
confront difficult underlying institutional, political, and social chal-
lenges. Overcoming such obstacles requires more than engineering 
expertise and financial resources, including sustained awareness 
and capacity building and a commitment to institutional and 
socio-cultural transformation spanning all levels of government 
and society.
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Table 4: Trends in risk factors and DRM strategies over the 
last several decades in Peru.
FROM RETROSPECTION TO FORESIGHT: 
PROJECTING FUTURE RISKS USING 
SCENARIO ANALYSIS
The insights of this analysis show that while DRM is seeing height-
ened attention in Peru, more comprehensive steps still must be 
taken to reduce hazards and vulnerabilities significantly in the 
longer term. The challenge in this context is large, however, given 
existing trends, continued uncertainty, and the potential contribu-
tions of socio-economic and climatic change to risk and vulnerabil-
ity (Table 4). This forward-looking section aligns findings from our 
PERC-based assessment with a scenario approach for considering 
risk and resilience around future El Niño events in Peru. As a guid-
ing question we ask: given existing and evolving risk drivers, how 
might different DRM strategies influence the evolution of El Niño 
impacts over the short to medium-term horizon (up to 2030) as 
compared to today? What additionally can be undertaken to com-
prehensively reduce risk and build resilience?
The discussion builds on scenario analysis (see Box 4) for scoping 
the space of future pathways, building on past insight derived from 
PERC analysis, as well as a comprehensive perspective on risk. The 
risk discussion identifies key risk drivers organized into hazard, ex-
posure, and vulnerability as well as risk actions for tackling those 
drivers (Figure 8).
6.
Risk Factors Trends Evidence References
Hazard
• Hazards generally increasing (climate 
change, extreme weather, glacier-loss)
• ENSO uncertain under climate change 
• “Coastal El Niño” poorly understood
Field et al. 2014;  
Magrin et al. 2014
Exposure
• Exposure continues to grow with 
largely unregulated development, 
especially in urban and peri-urban 
contexts 
Seminario & Ruiz 2008;  
UN 2014
Vulnerability
• Vulnerability is highly uneven across 
social groups, but continues to 
increase for many, especially the 
poorest segments of society
CAF 2000;  
Calderon et al. 2015
Risk reduction measures
Corrective and preparedness
Prospective
• Corrective and preparedness meas-
ures substantially increase around 
forecasted El Niño events then 
stagnate post-event
• Prospective measures are recent and 
incipient
CAF 2000;  
UN 2014
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Box 4
Scenario analysis is a technique and structured process, often used 
in systems analysis, for qualitatively or quantitatively projecting key 
variables of interest (in this case disaster risk and resilience) as a 
function of their drivers based on shared narratives (stories) about 
future socio-economic development and other inputs (Notten et al. 
2003). Scenarios link narratives and models, and can be derived 
by experts in top-down fashion (e.g. IPCC's climate scenarios) or 
bottom-up as part of a participatory process as often used by NGOs 
and community-based organizations.
Scenario analysis has been widely used for global, collective prob-
lems associated with high uncertainty  (e.g., climate change) as 
well as applied in local-participatory context to explore solutions to 
contested local problems (e.g. siting of waste dumps). Building on 
the PERC-retrospective analysis presented, the following discussion 
presents an approach for qualitatively and quantitatively projecting 
future flood risks including its drivers.
Scenario-based approaches - key aspects
Figure 8: Risk framework and scenario analysis. 
Building on IPCC 2012.
Understanding the past
 Increasing
 risk scena
rio
 Focus large
ly on emerg
ency respon
se
Projecting the future-scenarios
 Decreasing risk scenario
 Stronger focus on prospective risk reduction
RISK Hazards 
Exposure 
Vulnerability 
Drivers
• Precipitation 
• Climate change
• El Niño
Actions
• Greenhouse gas emission reduction
Drivers
• Increasing people and assets in hazard zones by 
way of unplanned and unregulated settlement
Actions
• Regional and community-level  
land-use planning
• Zoning regulations and enforcement
• Resettlement
Drivers
• Inappropriate building material,  
lack of building codes
• Lack of effective infrastructure
• Uneven access to resources and knowledge
Actions
• Prevention
• Risk awareness
• Preparedness
• Risk financing
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Risk scenarios and projections: 
narratives to numbers
Drawing upon our analysis of historical and contemporary DRM 
trends and institutional development in Peru, we propose three 
scenarios depicting different potential DRM pathways for the near 
to medium-term future.
Scenario 1: Ad hoc response 
The first of these scenarios generally reflects the approach taken 
to DRM in Peru over the last few decades and before recent at-
tempts to create a more integrated approach via the creation of 
SINAGERD in 2011. DRM actions in this scenario are dominated 
by short-term preparedness measures undertaken on an ad-hoc 
basis in the context of pending (i.e. forecasted) or recent disaster. 
Such measures feature several characteristics that help to explain 
their prevalence in the past as well as their potential to continue to 
dominate DRM approaches in the future. First, these strategies fea-
ture lower initial financial and broader transaction costs, as they do 
not require the development and maintenance of a substantial in-
stitutional framework and bureaucracy explicitly for DRM. Instead 
they rely heavily on existing national-level ministries and the na-
tional police and armed forces to respond to disasters as they arise. 
Such response strategies have historically been orchestrated at the 
national-level and, if effective, can generate substantial political 
capital for public authorities. This approach also has relatively low 
potential for generating social conflict around contested processes 
like zoning and relocation. The principal downside to this approach 
is that severe disasters often overwhelm short-term capacities to 
correct risk-producing conditions and prepare for and respond to 
disaster impacts as they strike. These shortcomings can thus con-
tribute to very high levels of losses and damages and significant 
long-term social upheaval.
Scenario 2: Engineered safety
The second scenario focuses on a trajectory characterized by an 
expanded focus on advanced planning for long-term corrective 
measures, particularly through the design and implementation of 
physical infrastructure projects (e.g. permanently channelized riv-
ers, levee systems, retaining walls, geodynamic barriers, etc.). This 
 
 
approach requires substantial upfront investment in these infra-
structural developments as well as in long-run maintenance costs. 
In a setting where short-term electoral cycles bear importantly on 
political decision-making, the often-lengthy periods required for 
construction and proof of worth of such projects may undermine 
their political feasibility. Such projects are also typically orchestrated 
by central governments, often with financial assistance from large 
multi-lateral lenders (e.g. World Bank) that can help defray the in-
itial financial impacts of development at the cost of long-term in-
debtedness. While such developments may generate some conflict 
over localized displacements or other impacts, they generally are 
not overly conflict prone. One considerable drawback, in addition 
to the overall cost and ongoing maintenance requirements of infra-
structure projects, is that they may lead to increasing settlement or 
use of “protected” but ultimately hazard-prone zones (i.e. through 
the “levee effect”), such that eventual infrastructure failure would 
be more catastrophic than prior to development. Concerns of cat-
astrophic failure are particularly acute in contexts where long-run 
maintenance may be difficult to complete or where hazards are 
becoming more extreme. 
Scenario 3: Resilience under uncertainty 
The third scenario reflects the effective implementation of an inte-
grative and multi-level DRM approach — similar to that envisioned 
in the recent Peruvian legislation establishing the SINAGERD and 
PLANAGERD — coupled with an aggressive commitment to pro-
spective DRM through enforcement of hazard-zoning regulations 
and related relocation processes. This approach features substan-
tial upfront and ongoing financial and institutional costs for organ-
izational development and implementation and capacity building 
across governmental sectors and levels as well as for the broad 
spectrum of DRM measures entailed. While national-level authori-
ties may still be charged with strategic direction and supervision of 
the overarching DRM system, this approach requires effective and 
sustained action at all levels of government and the material re-
sources and professional capacities to support such action. The im-
plementation of the approach’s zoning and relocation requirements, 
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Figure 9: Loss trends based on projective forensic analysis.
Data: Losses-CRED 2017; Flood risk-Winsemius et al. 2013.
particularly in a context like Peru where occupation of risk-prone 
spaces is pervasive, is likely to generate substantial levels of so-
cial conflict and resistance. Effective implementation of such an 
approach thus requires strong political commitment, dedicated re-
sources over the long-term, and a comprehensive transformation 
of the culture around DRM in government and broader society. 
While the initial costs of this approach are likely to be the highest 
of the three scenarios (this approach, in fact, demands some of 
the same measures encompassed by the other strategies), over the 
long term this strategy should significantly lessen the impacts of El 
Niño and other disasters on Peruvian society.
Figure 9 shows the large variability in observed flood losses in Peru 
with the recent severe ENSO events producing massive impacts, 
while other flooding led to small losses only. Modeled average 
risk over the future is projected to decrease, particularly with an 
approach building on ad-hoc response. Engineered safety empha-
sizing further corrective, largely physical, risk reduction will help 
to arrest increases in risk. Yet, more is needed and a resilience-fo-
cused strategy proposing broad-based resilience building across 
financial, human, social, natural as well as physical capital will be 
an even more promising future pathway with substantial benefits.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the analysis presented above and drawing especially 
upon the insights provided by our interview respondents, we offer 
the following policy-targeted recommendations: 
• Given the recurrent and unpredictable nature of ENSO in Peru, it 
is important to move beyond an “emergency” mindset and dis-
aster response approach towards transformative DRM measures 
that combine long-term prospective and corrective strategies.
• The stochastic recurrence of El Niño highlights the importance 
of continuity in the institutional arrangements for directing and 
implementing DRM activities related to the phenomenon. While 
ENFEN plays an important role in event forecasting, a perma-
nent multi-sectoral and multi-level council or working group 
could serve a critical role as a coordinating body within the na-
tion’s institutional structure for risk management (SINAGERD).
• Institutional capacities for integrated risk management are 
needed across all levels of government. Given the key role of 
regional and local governments as the principal implementers 
of DRM actions, the building of such capacities at these levels 
should be prioritized through the development of permanent re-
source allocations and programs that work not only to prepare 
competent professionals but also to keep them in their posts in 
order to address problems of frequent staff turnover and a lack 
of institutional memory.  
• Representation of local and regional governments in the 
National Risk Management Council (CONAGERD) would 
strengthen the role of these governmental levels in strategic 
DRM planning and decision-making.
• Increased funding for DRM at the national level supports the 
development of ex ante risk-management strategies throughout 
the country. In order to capitalize on the potential of this funding, 
efforts are required to enhance the capacities of regional and 
local-level governments in accessing funds and directing spend-
ing towards long-term prospective and corrective DRM strategies. 
• Increased monitoring and evaluation of how funds—especially 
those dispersed under formal declarations of emergency—are 
used for DRM activities will help to improve transparency and 
accountability and is likely to lead to improved DRM outcomes. 
To the extent possible, funding for DRM actions should be 
distributed via regular budgetary programs rather than under 
emergency and ad-hoc circumstances. 
• Prospective and corrective measures should be worked into 
long-term development planning and implemented continuous-
ly, rather than on an ad-hoc basis once disasters are imminent.
• Peru has made substantial progress in establishing basic legis-
lation and policies that support prospective risk management 
in hazard-prone settings — e.g. in watercourses and zones of 
immitigable risk — as well as related policies for integrated 
watershed management and landscape-level planning. Rather 
than having separate ministries work independently to imple-
ment each of these sets of related regulations, efforts should be 
made to promote inter-sectoral collaboration and create syner-
gies between these efforts.
• The potential to replicate and expand DRM infrastructure that 
has proven to be effective in trial settings (e.g. geodynamic bar-
riers) should be evaluated. Nevertheless, protective infrastruc-
ture creation should not be prioritized in cases where it has 
significant potential to create greater risk over the long-term. 
• The impacts of repeated severe El Niño events suggest that in 
some cases relocation of at-risk populations and infrastructure 
is likely the most effective and sustainable option for long-term 
risk reduction. The extensive damage resulting from the 2017 
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event along with the current public awareness of hazard expo-
sures and underlying vulnerabilities may be effective incentives 
for promoting relocation.  
• While relocation is an important strategy in some settings, 
avoiding the  continued or recurrent settlement of high-risk 
spaces through the establishment and enforcement of effective 
zoning regulations is paramount.
• The effective implementation of hazard-zoning policies and reloca-
tion processes may involve complex cultural, socio-economic, and 
political dynamics that require careful analysis, public consultation, 
and negotiation. These processes should be facilitated by profes-
sionals experienced in conflict management and negotiation.
• There is a strong need for the increased involvement of civil- 
society actors in DRM planning and action,  including from 
grassroots and non-governmental organizations, universities, 
and the private sector.
• Given similar patterns of impacts over the last several severe El 
Niño events in Peru, there is a clear and urgent need to increase 
learning from past events. A shortage of analysis and recom-
mendations is not the problem: with past events, recommen-
dations for specific disaster risk-reduction measures have been 
made. Nevertheless, effective strategies for both the dissemina-
tion and implementation of recommendations are critical. 
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